Originally posted by Mordred
I would argue first of all that there is a sweet spot inherent in ballpark design... too small and every pop fly is out of the park. Too large and everything falls in the park and nobody can get to anything.

The best design is somewhere in the middle. Think for a minute, what the biggest ballpark in the NL is. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure it's Colorado's. Look at who lead the majors this year in batting:

Larry Walker with .350
Todd Helton finished second in NL with .336

2000: Todd Helton with .372
1999: Larry Walker .379
1998: Larry Walker .363
1993: Andres Gallaragga .370

Try and tell me that Colorado's large outfield isn't inflating their BA just a tad? Yes I know the ball carries forever and a lot of homeruns are scored... but still there's a LOT of room to land in.

Besides, take away 10 of Bonds' home runs and he still has 63... which seems to be 3 better than Ruth

Mordred

Originally posted by Mordred
I would argue first of all that there is a sweet spot inherent in ballpark design... too small and every pop fly is out of the park. Too large and everything falls in the park and nobody can get to anything.

The best design is somewhere in the middle. Think for a minute, what the biggest ballpark in the NL is. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure it's Colorado's. Look at who lead the majors this year in batting:

Larry Walker with .350
Todd Helton finished second in NL with .336

2000: Todd Helton with .372
1999: Larry Walker .379
1998: Larry Walker .363
1993: Andres Gallaragga .370

Try and tell me that Colorado's large outfield isn't inflating their BA just a tad? Yes I know the ball carries forever and a lot of homeruns are scored... but still there's a LOT of room to land in.

Take away 10 of Bonds' home runs and he still has 63... which seems to be 3 better than Ruth

Originally posted by juiio


And who is starting the stopwatches? Do they have precision tools to start time exactly when he takes off and stop exactly when he reaches base?

I see you graduated from the classicman school of debating, where statistics presented by others are either inaccurate or irrelevant and statistics present by you are 100% accurate and the sole voice of reason . Theres a difference between you and him though. He says it all with tongue-in-cheek. You actually believe it. Oh well. Think whatever you want. I'm through with you.

Originally posted by juiio
By the way, I wouldn't trust readings from a stopwatch today either. Yeah you can get close, but theres still too much based on human reaction by the guy using the stopwatch.

Originally posted by Sykes
The fastest player in the AL today is alleged to by Ichiro Suzuki, who has been clocked at 3.7 sec. to first. Do you think that the timekeeper at Beaumont's record feat could've been off by nearly 3/4ths of a second?

Originally posted by Sykes
FWIW, as one who coached baseball for years, I can testify that I could be accurate up to hundredths of a second when timing players.

Originally posted by Mordred
Did pitchers back in the day throw as hard as they do now? What would you estimate would be the speed of a fastball that Ruth might have faced? 80 mph? 90 mph?

What kind of pitches would a guy be seeing after 8 innings and a pitcher on 3 days rest? Would these be easier or harder to hit?

The magical .400 has been broken 37 times (albeit many of those were in the magical 1887 year ). No was their just a preponderance of incredible hitters? According to your assertions we live in an era of juiced balls and tiny ballparks with a homerun hit on every pitch. Now please explain to me why no one has been able to break .400 in the past 60 years? Does it have anything to do with the fact that the talent pool has been so diluted and the pitchers are so terrible as you purport? Maybe it's just that all the hitters today are terrible too? Does that make any sense to you?

Homeruns aren't everything and sure the ballparks inflate the homerun numbers a little...

Do you really honestly believe that if say Bonds were to be playing in '27 he wouldn't have been one of the better players out there? You don't seem to think anyone who plays the game today is even close to anyone who played back then? Where is the logic in this?

Originally posted by juiio

Originally posted by juiio
I didn't say he wasn't the fastest ever. He might be. I just said don't put faith in theose numbers as being right.

Originally posted by juiio
Listen to the words coming out of my keyboard:

All I'm saying is that when humans are timing someone with a stopwatch, there is a margin of error. Hell, those numbers could be slower than what he really ran. Margin of error is a very simple concept. I'm sure you can find resources on the web to explain the concept to you.

Originally posted by Thrush


Taken from this article : http://msnbc.com/news/197855.asp


Football quarterbacks, receivers and running backs continually rewrite the record books, eclipsing such greats as Sammy Baugh and Jim Brown.

Originally posted by Sykes
FWIW, for all you statistics fanatics, check your edition of Total Baseball, and see whether they classify Yankee Stadium as a pitcher's or a hitter's park.

Originally posted by Sykes
There's no doubt that pitchers today do not have the velocity that they once did. Any scout will confirm this for you. Pitching coaches and former big leaguers will all tell you the same.

...this is the sole reason why Latin America now seems to be producing the greatest bumper crop of baseball talent in the world--because their culture has embraced the sport; as ours once did.

It is plainly evident that today's American kids are more sedentary than they used to be.

I ask, in all seriousness, how could such an environment possibly produce stronger throwing arms than there used to be?

In Ruth's day there were roughly 128 pitchers in MLB. Today, there are about 350.

To answer your question, seeing as how statistical evidence reveals that late-inning games were no less frequently lost, nor more offensively prejudiced against earlier innings, decades ago than there are now, I would say that the record speaks for itself.

Please stop to consider the Darwinian aspects here.

With the outfield barriers such a short poke away, footspeed, choking up, protecting the plate on two-strikes, bunting, mobility in the batter's box, hustle, etc., have all more or less fallen by the wayside (Ichiro is by far today's best proponent of these skills). Strikeouts are mounting in record numbers, with no end in sight.

The inability to hit .400 is due to this loss of discipline ...<SNIP>Randy Johnson gameplans this universal trend with a simple, but tremendously effective, pitching strategy. Hitters, regardless of their skill against everyone else, are putty in his hands.

Ask the dominant moundsmen of the last two decades whether they would rather face Mark McGwire or Wade Boggs? Sammy Sosa or Tony Gwynn?

I don't know. But it is my firm belief that it would be infinitely easier for the players of yore to step effortlessly into today's relatively cushy game than otherwise.

Originally posted by Mordred
Done. Yankee's Stadium was considered a Pitchers park for most of the time Ruth played there. Here's the Park Factor numbers from 1920-1930...

1920 - 104
1921 - 102
1922 - 102
1923 - 102
1924 - 100
1925 - 97t
1926 - 98
1927 - 97*
1928 - 97*
1929 - 93*
1930 - 96t

Originally posted by Sykes
Yankee Stadium opened its doors in April of 1923, so any figure you're citing prior to this date refers to their former home, Polo Grounds (which it seems is, after all, not that beneficial to hitters).

Originally posted by Sykes
Yankee Stadium opened its doors in April of 1923, so any figure you're citing prior to this date refers to their former home, Polo Grounds (which it seems is, after all, not that beneficial to hitters).

Originally posted by Mordred
Ummm... okay? I seriously question this statement. Please provide a source other than your opinion and then I'll concede the point to you.

When did a little leaguer last play in the MLB? I think you'll find most good high-school and college players wouldn't be considered sedentary. It's only after they hit the bigs that they get fat

True. In 1920 there were 121 pitchers who saw a decent amount of time on the mound (I did not count those who only had a handful of appearances). There were 294 in 1996. Lets pretend for a moment that back in 1920 MLB allowed Blacks and Latinos and Asians to play baseball. That means that the 121 pitchers came from a potential talent pool of 106 million (1920 census). So 1 pitcher from every 876,000 citizens. Assuming that the number of pitchers hasn't changed much in 4 years, we have 294 pitchers coming from a talent pool of 280 Americans (April 2000). That's 1 pitcher from every 950k people. Plus we know scout the Latin American countries thoroughly. So really HOW diluted is the pitching comparitively? We seem to have gotten more selective over the years.

I'm sorry I have Total Baseball's 5th edition which does not have the article in question. Please quote me some statistics rather than anecdotal evidence.

Three decades, three ballgames, three managers, three late-inning leads; three different decisions. Which manager made the right choices? September 7, 1952: Steve Gromek, pitching for the Cleveland Indians against the St. Louis Browns, completes seven innings in possession of a two-run, 3-1 lead. His manager, Al Lopez, sends Gromek out to start the final two innings in search of the complete-game victory.

September 7, 1972: Twenty years later to the day, Atlanta Braves rookie Jimmy Freeman also takes a two-run, 3-1 lead into the eighth inning against the Los Angeles Dodgers. Freeman's manager, Eddie Mathews, sends him back out to the mound, but he also warms up Ron Schueler in the event of trouble.

September 7, 1992: Another twenty years later, the Milwaukee Brewers hold a two-run lead over Cleveland after seven innings on the strength of four-hit pitching by rookie phenom Cal Eldred. His manager, Phil Garner, lifts Eldred before the start of the eighth, turning the game over to his setup man, Jeff Austin, and then at the start of the ninth to his closer, Doug Henry.

Which manager made the right decision? If the criteria for judging success is winning the game, then all three did. In 1952, Gromek completed his 3-1 victory without incident and without aid; in 1972, Freeman pitched a scoreless eighth, allowed a leadoff baserunner in the ninth and gave way to Schueler, who preserved the two-run win; and in 1992 both Austin and Henry pitched incident-free innings as the Brewers proceeded to shut out the Indians 2-0.

Three generations, three methods of bullpen use or nonuse, all equally successful. Although the styles managers employ to wrap up victories have changed over the decades-and although the salaries paid to relief pitchers have changed even more-the results have not. Major league teams today blow late-inning leads at almost precisely the same frequency they did twenty and even forty years ago, when there was no such thing as a closer or setup man, bullpens were commonly refuges for failed starters, and managers signaled for relief help only at the moment of absolute peril.

That assertion will probably surprise a generation of fans brought up on the theories of Tony Larussa. His widely praised and ultrastructured Oakland pen-a lefty specialist, a righty specialist, and a setup man, all leading up to the closer (who starts the ninth inning any time his team leads by three runs or less) has become the model for virtually every major league team. Today, a major league is second-guessed if he doesn't do what Phil Garner did on that September day in 1992, pull a starting pitcher after seven innings no matter that he may be pitching a shutout.

Defying those widely held perceptions is a study of every game played in the major leagues during three complete seasons in which managers employed distinctly different bullpen usage patterns. In terms of victories (and winning or losing is all that concerns us in baseball), the eighth-inning and ninth-inning strategies of the 1990s represent no advance whatsoever upon those of the 1970s... or the 1950s.

The following table shows the percentage frequency with which teams won when they held the lead in each situation in 1952, 1972, and 1992.
In every instance, the differences are a matter of a couple of percentage points at most, and not statistically meaningful. The differences do not offer evidence that one usage pattern provides better results than another.

Take note that this is a study of the effectiveness of various strategies relating to bullpen use as they impact on teams that lead in the late innings of major league games. Accordingly, its focus is entirely on pitching changes that occurred in major league games after the final out was recorded in the seventh inning. It should not necessarily be inferred, in cases where no pitching change was made in the eighth or ninth innings, that the pitcher who continued on the mound was the starter. In some cases, pitching changes may have been made prior to the eighth inning. Since the study's focus is on use of the bullpen in the eighth and ninth innings, any earlier changes were not considered as part of the data.


Summary of Conclusions


Here is a summary of the conclusions drawn from the study.

1. There is no statistically significant evidence supporting the idea that the modern concept of a specialized bullpen-a save specialist, a setup man, and lefty-righty specialist--contributes to winning baseball games more frequently than other bullpen usage patterns that have been tried in previous years.

2. The clearest finding is that, contrary to what would appear to be the accepted notion, a highly structured bullpen--one in which roles are defined and adhered to in a reasonably rigid fashion--provides a team with no advantage. As a general proposition, teams with a highly structured bullpen lose late-inning leads in roughly the same proportion as teams of previous eras that had no structured system.

3. As a corollary to this, modern teams that invest heavily in "ensemble" bullpens or in "closers" (or in both) tend to lose leads at roughly the same percentage as modern teams that spend less money on bullpens, or closers, or both--particularly in the National League.

4. As an additional corollary, the evidence is substantial that a significant increase in the number of saves recorded in 1992 compared with previously studied seasons is wholly reflexive and gratuitous, and provides the saving team no actual advantage in the standings. The pitchers who accumulate these gratuitous saves, however, cost the average major league team in excess of $2 million in 1992.

5. This would seem to suggest that the value of a highly paid, structured bullpen, complete with a multimillion dollar saver, is merely imitative and cosmetic.


Methodology


The study was conducted by examining box scores from games played in 1992, 1972, and 1952. These seasons provide contrast both across time and in the generally accepted patterns of bullpen use.

At the time the study was conducted, 1992 was the most recent season for which box score data was readily available. In 1992 managers generally employed a rigid system for bullpen work: one reliever was identified as the closer, another as the setup man, another as the lefty specialist, another as the "middle reliever," etc.; a manager assumed that his starting pitcher would not finish the game.

In 1972 bullpen roles were evolving, but not yet rigid; the concept of a closer (as opposed to the earlier "fireman," who was summoned in times of trouble) was in its early stages. There were a few Sparky Lyle and Mike Marshall come to mind-but they tended to pitch under less rigid rules than the modem closer. They might commonly pitch three or four innings, and might enter a game while trailing. Beyond that, several teams did not yet utilize either a "closer" or a structured bullpen. In 1972, a manager hoped that his starting pitcher would finish the game, but was willing to use his bullpen if necessary.

In 1952, bullpen strategies had only begun to develop. Most teams still viewed relievers as failed starters or journeymen who should be used only as a last resort. Complete games were reasonably common, and only a few teams-the Yankees and Phillies being examples-had developed first-rate relief specialists. In 1952, a manager assumed his starting pitcher would finish the game, and turned to his bullpen only when forced to do so.

For each season, all games were studied in which a save situation" occurred. A "save situation" was defined, for purposes of this study, as any game in which one team led by three or fewer runs at the end of either seven or eight innings. The studied games were divided into game situations in which a team:

A. led by one run after seven innings
B. led by two runs after seven innings
C. led by three runs after seven innings
D. led by one run after eight innings
E. led by two runs after eight innings
F. led by three runs after eight innings

A calculation was then made of the percentage of times the team that led in each of those situations actually won the game.

Notation was also made as to whether the team that led the game in each situation subsequently changed pitchers. An additional notation was made to determine the statistical correlation between changing pitchers and victories. For each category itemized above, the result was four bits of information concerning the percentage of games in which:

A. a leading team actually won.
B. a leading team changed pitchers.
C. a leading team that changed pitchers won.
D. a leading team that did not change pitchers won.

As described above, a total of 5,534 "save situations" were included in the study. This does not necessarily mean that the study consisted of 5,534 games, since a single game could theoretically have offered save situations-and in practice, numerous games did-after both the seventh and eighth innings.


Unknowns and Rule Changes


There was one major rules change over the course of the study that theoretically could have affected the results. This was imposition of the designated hitter rule in the American League in 1973. To determine whether there was any real impact, the games of 1992 were divided according to whether they were played in the American League, where the DH was in place, or the National League, where it was not. Theoretically, if the DH impacted the study, it seems logical that there would have been a greater percentage of lost leads in the American League than in the National League. In fact, the opposite was true: in 1992, National League teams lost 136 leads in save situations," while American League teams lost 104. The DH rule seems not to have been a factor.

Several other factors of potential import are difficult if not impossible to quantif'. Here is a summary of them:

A. Improvement in the relative performance of players over the course of the study. In the mid-1980s, Dick Cramer conducted a study in which he demonstrated that the performance of the average major league player had gradually improved over the course of years. His study, which included the years 1952 and 1972, showed that in order to equate batting averages for the years 1952 and 1972, it was necessary to adjust them upwards by approximately .039 in the American League, and .017 in the National League. There is no data measuring whether that trend has continued into 1992. Beyond that, it is not demonstrated that improvement in relative batting average necessarily equates to an overall improvement in the relative quality of the batters, since average is onlv one [break] assert with certainty whether-and if so, to what degree-pitchers and fielders may have improved overtime, although the commonly held view is that they have.

B. Quality of starting pitching. We know that starters pitched more innings in 1952 than in 1972, and more in 1972 than in 1992, but we do not know whether this is because the starting pitchers as a group were better in the earlier years. The study presents evidence supporting the theory that at least a substantial proportion of the falloff in starters' innings is a result of simple managerial reflex. League ERAs are roughly equivalent for the study years, but those do not necessarily measure starter quality either. Between 1952 and 1992, the four-man rotation has generally given way to the five-man rotation. If anything, however, that should argue that the starters of today should be better rested and more fit to complete their assignments than in previous years. Several new pitches have come into vogue-the slider and the split-fingered fastball especially-and it is possible that those pitches could create additional strain on pitchers' arms that did not exist in 1952 or 1972. However, the evidence arguing for or against any of these possibilities is anecdotal.

C. Race. This final nonquantifiable factor must be acknowledged. By 1952, baseball had been integrated. Yet not all major league teams had been integrated, and the inclusion of minority talent was not nearly as complete as it would become. Plainly, the broadening of the player talent pool over the course of intervening years has improved the general quality of on-field talent. It is theoretically possible that this broadening of talent could be a factor impacting on the ability of modern teams to hold leads over late innings at a rate no greater than earlier teams. While this is a fair topic for speculati6n, however, I believe the evidence suggests this theory cannot be used to deduce that 1952 teams, for example, would have held late leads at a rate greater than occurs today. By 1972, the major leagues already could be viewed as fully integrated. If the higher proportion of African Americans in the major leagues' racial makeup were properly isolated as a factor, those improvements should have shown up in the performance of teams in 1972 relative to 1952. Yet the data for 1972 is approximately the same as for both 1952 and 1992.


The Hemline Effect


For practical purposes, this two-generations-in-the-making shift in patterns of bullpen use can be compared to periodic and whimsical changes in dress hemlines: A lot of money is spent, but the gain is in the eye of the beholder. Note the lack of difference in how well an average" team held leads in each of the years that were examined:
Although managers did not derive greater benefit from their bullpen in 1992 than in previous seasons, they clearly relied on it to a far greater extent. In 1952, managers who led by one run after eight innings went to their bullpen only 17.1 percent of the time. By 1972, this figure had risen to 29.0 percent. In 1992, however, managers who led by one run after eight innings went to their bullpen a whopping 66.1 percent of the time . . . while winning 4 percent less often.

An even more clear example of this trend to reflexive bullpen use is seen in the category of games in which a team led by three runs after eight innings. In 1952, managers in that situation called for a reliever only 21.4 percent of the time; by 1972, that percentage had actually fti~llen fractionally, to 21.3 percent. In 1992, however, managers of teams that led by three runs after eight innings went to their bullpen 54.7 percent of the time. They could hardly have achieved a significantly greater winning percentage, since teams in that advantageous position won 95.1 percent of the time in 1952, and 95.5 percent of the time in 1972. In fact, in 1992 teams that led by three runs after eight innings also won 95.5 percent of the time.


The Gratuitous Save


In 1992, relief pitchers were credited with 1,109 major league saves. In 1972, the total was 733 In 1952 the total was 306. How do we account for.this increase, which amounts to a bout 200 percent over four decades and roughly 50 percent since 1972?

First, more major league games were played in l992 than there were in either of the previous years: 2,106 in 1992 compared with 1,859 in 1972 (a strike-shortened year) and 1,239 in 1952. But even a 70 percent increase in games played since 1952 accounts for less than half the 200 percent increase in saves. A 13 percent increase in games played since 1972 accounts for only a small proportion of the 50 percent increase in saves since that year. Theoretically, teams might simply be playing more “close" games than in previous years, resulting in more save opportunities. But that is demonstrably not so; here is the data for average number of "save opportunity" games played per team in each of the studied years:
If close games are not being played with greater frequency, and if the schedule does not provide an answer, how, then, do we account for the increase in saves? It seems likely that the preponderance of these additional saves were credited in situations where the reliever was not actually needed. To determine the number of gratuitous saves awarded today, we first must determine a baseline number of saves that might be expected to be earned by a pitcher in any year.

In attempting to determine a baseline for saves, we can use the following facts and assumptions:

1. We can assume that in 1952 managers seldom used savers" in cases other than actual necessity, and often enough not even then. "Actual necessity" is defined here as that point at which the game is in imminent danger of being lost.

2. We can assume that by approximately 1972, managers more readily used "savers", and did so in most if not all cases of relative necessity. "Relative necessity" is that point at which it is foreseeable that a game could be lost, although the game may not actually be imperiled.

3. Based on complete-game statistics, we can assume that in 1972 managers had not yet begun to employ the strategy of using relievers in preventative roles; that is, bringing a designated “saver” into the game at the start of the ninth inning.

4. We know that in 1952, Al Brazle led the major leagues in saves with 16. We also know that the average major league team accumulated approximately 19 saves that season. We know that in 1972, Clay Carroll led the major leagues with 37 saves, and the average major league team accumulated 30.5 saves.

5. We know that the number of "save opportunities" per team has increased by about five since 1 952--a factor that encompasses the lengthened schedule-but has not increased since 1972, despite changes in the scoring rule for crediting a save that came into the game in 1973 and 1975.

6. We know that teams blow leads in save opportunities with about the same frequency today that they did in 1952 and 1972.

In the context of the above facts and assumptions, we may thus deduce that the baseline figure for legitimate saves lies somewhere close to the actual save figures for 1972--that is, approximately 37 saves for the top saver, and approximately 30 saves for the average team.

That being the case, any significant number of saves earned by the best reliever in excess of 37, and any significant number of saves earned by the average staff in excess of about 30, may fairly be considered as probably gratuitous in the context of winning ballgames.


What's So Great About Being MVP?


The record of Dennis Eckersley in 1992 provides perhaps the best illustration of the concept of a "gratuitous save." In that year, Eckersley won the Cy Young and, Most Valuable Player awards for appearing in 69 games and earning 51 saves for the Oakland A's. Let's take a look at those 51 saves.

A. To earn 7 of those saves, Eckersley protected a one-run lead for one inning. In an additional 3 games, he protected a one-run lead for 1.1 to 2 innings. In each of these games, he faced at least the tying run, and may theoretically-from the box scores we cannot always be certain-have had the tying run on base when he entered the game. By any definition, these 10 saves are "quality" saves.

B. To earn 15 of his 51 saves, however, Eckersley was only required to enter the game at the start of the ninth inning and protect a two-run lead. In each of these 15 games, he was not required to face the potential tying run unless he himself put that run on base. In eight of these games, Eckersley replaced a pitcher who had pitched at least one previous scoreless inning. In an additional four games, Eckersley pitched between 1.1 and 2 innings while protecting a-two-run lead. Based on an examination of the box scores, it is possible that he faced the potential tying run in a maximum of one of those four games. In all four of those games, he replaced a pitcher who had not been scored upon. Taken together, these 19 games represent at least 18 times Eckersley received a save without ever facing the potential tying run, unless he himself brought it to the plate. In 12 of these 19 games, Eckersley replaced a pitcher who had pitched at least one inning without being scored upon. Many of these 18-to 19 saves, especially the ones in which Eckersley replaced a pitcher who had not been scored upon, might reasonably be characterized as gratuitous.

C. To earn an additional 10 saves, Eckersley pitched one inning or less and protected a three-run lead. In 9 of these games, he entered at the start of the ninth inning, needing only to record three outs before three runs scored in order to get credit for the save. In all of these games, Eckersley replaced a pitcher who had not given up a run in the previous inning. These saves can fairly be characterized as highly gratuitous.

D. To earn his final 12 saves, Eckersley protected a lead of four or five runs for between one-third of an inning and two innings. Recognizing that the lack of information regarding specific on-base situations at the time he entered the games in question makes an absolute judgment impossible, it still seems reasonable to assume that in most of these save situations Eckersley did not have to face the potential tying run unless he himself brought it to bat.

In summary, approximately only a dozen times in his 51 saves did Dennis Eckersley actually face the potential game-tying run. In the high proportion of his saves, perhaps 35 or more, the tying run never left the on-deck circle, and perhaps never left the dugout. In many of them, the pitcher relieved by Eckersley was in neither imminent nor proximate peril. In these situations, the practical impact of bringing Eckersley into the game was more on his save total than on the game. These are "gratuitous saves."

The often gratuitous nature of the save as utilized in 1992 can be illustrated in another way. In 13 of Eckersley's 69 appearances, he allowed one run or more. We might assume that his record in these l3 games was not impressive. In some respects that's an accurate assessment: His earned run average for those 13 games, for instance, was 10.69. Yet his record for those same 13 games was 2 wins, just 1 loss and 8 saves. Based solely on the save data, you would say Eckersley had pitched well over those 13 games. It's plausible that those eight saves, the difference between a 43-save' and 51-save season, were also the margin by which he won the MVP and Cy Young Awards.

For forty-plus years, managers have wondered what to do with their bullpens, and have set their sails to the prevailing wind. What they have accomplished leaves fans to wonder.

I'm sorry but athletic adult males are consistantly getting stronger, bigger and faster. That's Darwin. BTW, how many bases did Ginger Beaumont steal or is that not a fair comparison? (I think the number is 263)

True the game has changed. Personally I love small ball, but I seem to be one of the few. You also realize that the game has changed because what's changed helps teams win ball games. Relief pitching didn't come in vogue because it was bad, but rather because it helped teams win.

More anecdotal evidence here. Yes Randy Johnson is an incredible pitcher and most batters have a hard time hitting off him. It's because he's good. So was Walter Johnson (probably the best of all time). Hitters back then were putty in his hands too.... but wait they didn't suck back then. Ergo, the Big Train must have been tons better than the Big Unit.

Originally posted by uberjoe
Well, you've been saying Yankee Stadium was a pitcher's park, and the numbers say it was as much of a pitcher's park as the Polo Grounds was a hitter's park. So according to you, the Polo Grounds was "beneficial" to hitters. You can't have it both ways.

Originally posted by Sykes
My citation was a solitary yield to statistics-obsessed Liliputians such as yourself.