DVD Talk
Supreme Court 2009-2010 Term [Archive] - DVD Talk Forum
 
Best Sellers
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Santa Buddies
Buy: $29.99 $9.99
8.
9.
10.
DVD Blowouts
1.
2.
Cars [Blu-ray]
Buy: $34.99 $15.49
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

PDA
DVD Reviews

View Full Version : Supreme Court 2009-2010 Term


Red Dog
10-05-09, 09:26 AM
It's the First Monday in October, which means a new Supreme Court term begins. This term should be much more exciting than last year's. You have more hot-button issues on tap (religion/establishment, guns, free speech, sports antitrust, Miranda rights, executive compensation, cruel/unusual punishment), a new Justice, and and there should be rampant speculation on whether Stevens will be retiring (while there is a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate).

Here a couple articles on the some of the more notable cases on tap:


http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1927760,00.html

Monday, Oct. 05, 2009
Five Supreme Court Cases to Watch This Term
By Dan Fletcher

The U.S. Supreme Court reconvenes for its 2009-10 term on Oct. 5, with most of the attention going to the court's freshest face, newly confirmed Justice Sonia Sotomayor. But Sotomayor and her eight colleagues won't have a lot of time for orientation: the court will start immediately on a docket of controversial cases that will call on Justices to consider new facets of the Establishment Clause, gun ownership and prison terms for minors, among other issues. In total, the Justices have already agreed to hear 55 cases in the new term. Here are five to keep an eye on.

Salazar v. Buono
At issue: Whether the government can permit the display of a crucifix on public land as per the Establishment Clause.

An 8-ft.-tall crucifix has stood on an outcrop called Sunrise Rock on the Mojave National Preserve since 1934, but in one of the court's earliest arguments of the term, the Justices will be asked to consider whether it should be removed. The battle has been brewing for a while — the cross, erected without government approval, was slated for removal by the U.S. National Park Service after a request from Buddhists to create their own memorial near the site was denied. But in 2000, Congress hastily passed a law prohibiting the use of public funds to remove the cross, in essence tying the National Park Service's hands. Congress declared the cross a National Memorial in 2002, and in 2003 it gave the small parcel of land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) — the group that constructed the original cross. (See TIME's photo-essay "Sonia Sotomayor, the Making of a Judge.")

The removal of the cross brings up the Establishment Clause, that long-debated line separating church and state that takes its name from the First Amendment (which begins, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"). This case has been in the court system since early 2000, before Congress's involvement. The National Park Service's attempt to transfer the land to the VFW, per the 2003 congressional order, has been viewed by the lower courts as an illegal way of circumventing repeated rulings compelling it to remove the cross. (Once the land is considered private property, the Establishment Clause no longer applies.) The Supreme Court will be asked to sort out the issue — and ownership of Sunrise Rock — once and for all.


Maryland v. Shatzer
At issue: The scope of the rights of police suspects, as given in the court's landmark 1966 decision, Miranda v. Arizona.

In Maryland v. Shatzer, Michael Shatzer was questioned by police about sexual abuse of his 3-year-old child, and after being told he had the right to counsel as part of his Miranda rights, declined to answer any questions without an attorney present. The officer never pursued Shatzer further, but nearly three years later, a different detective questioned Shatzer, at which point he admitted abuse. Shatzer now argues this confession is inadmissible because the second police officer, who was unaware of Shatzer's original Miranda request, questioned him without an attorney present. (Read "Four Enduring Myths About Supreme Court Nominees.")

The court has already considered a similar case in 1981's Edwards v. Arizona, in which the court found admissions made by a suspect without the presence of an attorney, which he had requested, inadmissible. But in Edwards, these admissions were made only a day after the suspect had been given his rights — not nearly three years later. The court will be asked to decide whether to treat their decision in Edwards as a so-called "bright-line" rule — that is, one that would create an absolute standard of police conduct in regard to the Miranda rights, regardless of how much time has passed.


Graham v. Florida / Sullivan v. Florida
At issue: Whether life imprisonment for juveniles on nonhomicide charges constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

The Eighth Amendment precludes cruel and unusual punishment, but it has long been left to the Supreme Court to define exactly what that term means. This court will be asked to consider it again in a pair of cases on the docket. In Sullivan, the petitioner was 13 years old when he was indicted as an adult and sentenced to life in prison without parole in Florida for sexual assault of an elderly woman. In Graham, a 19-year-old violated his parole by committing attempted armed robbery while on parole for two previous robbery attempts he had committed while he was a minor. He too was subsequently sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

In making their decision, the court will review its logic in 2005's Roper v. Simmons, which held that individuals could not be sentenced to death for crimes committed under the age of 18, as the court found that minors had a "lack of maturity." The petitioners in Graham and Sullivan are arguing for a similar standard for their noncapital offenses.


National Rifle Association v. Chicago / McDonald v. Chicago
At issue: Second Amendment rights to gun ownership.

A pair of cases challenge Chicago's 27-year-old ban on handgun sales within the city limits. Originally designed to curb violence in the city, the ban has long irked Second Amendment advocates, who take an expansive view of the amendment's wording that the "right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." But the Supreme Court had long held that the Second Amendment pertained only to federal laws, until a 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller struck down a ban on handguns and automatic weapons in Washington, D.C. The ruling marked the first time the Supreme Court acknowledged an individual right to bear arms, and it opened the door for these challenges to the Chicago regulation.


American Needle v. National Football League
At issue: Whether sporting leagues should be exempt from antitrust regulations.

Experts say American Needle may turn out to be the most important legal decision in sporting history. The sportswear manufacturer contracted with NFL teams to produce hats and headgear with official team logos. But the NFL decided to give an exclusive leaguewide license to Reebok in 2000, leading American Needle to sue, claiming the NFL's action violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by limiting the market for who could produce team-branded merchandise.

The fundamental question for the court to decide is whether the NFL should be considered a single entity or a collection of 32 individual businesses. The answer to this question has repercussions beyond the production of licensed merchandise. If the NFL is considered a single entity, it would largely be exempt from antitrust laws, giving the league not only continued right to grant exclusive licenses for team apparel but also the ability to make decisions on a leaguewide basis. This opens the door to the NFL — rather than individual teams — determining things like ticket prices and player salaries. Indeed, the bargaining power of the NFL Players Union is based on antitrust legislation that the league would largely be immune to if it receives a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court. Other sporting leagues are watching the American Needle case closely; many have filed briefs in favor of the NFL's position.



http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1004/p02s01-usju.html

Questions surround start of new Supreme Court term

How will Sonia Sotomayor vote? Is John Paul Stevens soon to retire? Will John Roberts and Samuel Alito be more unabashedly conservative? The term begins Monday.

By Warren Richey | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the October 4, 2009 edition

The coming year offers an opportunity for court watchers to more clearly define the character of the emerging Roberts Court during Chief Justice John Roberts's fifth term on the bench. And it presents a chance far superior to the wishy-washy Senate confirmation hearings to finally learn something of the real Sonia Sotomayor, the high court's newest justice.

Will she be a liberal stalwart or a sometimes ally to the conservatives? If so, in which cases?

The term already includes potential blockbuster cases examining the applicability of Second Amendment gun rights to state and local governments, campaign-finance regulations, life sentences for juveniles, and whether Congress violated the separation of powers when it created an independent accounting oversight board.

The court's options will reveal more than just legal winners and losers. How these disputes are analyzed and decided by the justices will offer legal scholars important clues about the evolving dynamics within the nation's highest court.

In addition to the arrival of a new justice, Justice John Paul Stevens's decision to hire only one law clerk (instead of the usual four) for the 2010-11 term has sparked speculation that he intends to leave the court in June.

Among key trends to watch will be whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito decide to put an unabashedly conservative stamp on the high court by joining their conservative colleagues to boldly overturn liberal legal precedents despite earlier pledges of a preference for judicial minimalism.

The broad internal dynamics at the Supreme Court are well established, with four liberal justices and four conservative justices. In the middle, often wielding a tiebreaking fifth vote, is Justice Anthony Ken*nedy, who leans conservative but sometimes swings to the liberal side in big, high-profile cases.

The arrival of Justice Sotomayor is not expected to significantly change this internal dynamic. Analysts say she should fit comfortably into the liberal wing and is expected to vote in ways similar to David Souter, the justice she replaced.

But she is not Souter. That has some liberals worried and some conservatives hopeful. Early in her legal career, Sotomayor worked as a prosecutor in New York City and later as a federal trial judge. Thus she knows intimately the challenges facing law enforcement officials.

When the high court hears a major case this term on whether police must give precise Miranda warnings before interrogating suspects, court watchers will want to see which Sotomayor votes in the case. Will it be the Latina civil rights activist concerned with defendants' rights, or the former big-city prosecutor concerned with helping the system fight crime and protect victims?

Thomas Goldstein, a lawyer who has often argued before the Supreme Court, says the departure of Mr. Souter and potential retirement of Justice Stevens could result in the court being nudged to the right. This is because their liberal replacements may not command the same respect that allowed Stevens and Souter to sometimes persuade Justice Kennedy to swing to the left.

"When that relationship is broken and you introduce somebody new into the equation, they can't possibly be as persuasive," Mr. Goldstein said in a recent panel discussion at the Cato Institute. "I think the ironic effect of new appointments replacing Justices Stevens and Souter will be to see the court gravitate to the right."

On Roberts and Justice Alito, analysts are awaiting the court's decision in a potential landmark campaign-finance case heard during a special argument session Sept. 9.

At issue in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is whether corporations can be barred from spending their treasury money on politically related advertisements during federal election season. The FEC, citing a 2002 campaign-finance law, said yes. Citizens United, a conservative nonprofit advocacy group, said the move amounted to government censorship.

Roberts's and Alito's positions in the case are being scrutinized because the justices were confronted with a similar issue in 2006 and refused to join their conservative colleagues in overturning the underlying legal precedents. Now they are being encouraged to take that step again.

Any move to strike down a portion of Congress's 2002 campaign-finance law and an earlier 1990 Supreme Court precedent will be portrayed by liberal critics as a particularly aggressive assertion of power by the high court's conservative wing. And it could be a defining moment for the emerging Roberts Court.

But it won't mean the conservatives will win every big battle at the Supreme Court. With the general 4-to-4 conservative-liberal split on hot-button cases, Kennedy continues to hold the power to decide many of America's most contentious disputes.

One such case involves two Florida teens who are serving life sentences for crimes they committed as juveniles. At issue in Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida is whether the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment bars Florida from keeping the young men imprisoned for the rest of their lives without any possibility for parole. At age 13, Joe Sullivan raped and robbed a 72-year-old woman. Terrance Graham committed a series of armed robberies at ages 16 and 17.

Kennedy will probably be the deciding vote in the case. In 2005, he provided the key vote to declare the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional. The question in the case is whether the same reasoning applies in the circumstances of the two Florida teens.

Free speech is also on the court's radar this term. At issue in US v. Stevens is whether Congress has the power to ban possession and distribution of images of animal cruelty, such as pit bull fights. A Virginia man was charged under a 1999 federal statute for including footage of a dogfight in Japan (where such fights are legal) in a documentary film he produced and distributed in the US. The central question is whether the First Amendment protects such depictions.

In another Florida case, the justices have agreed to examine a property rights dispute in which owners of seafront property complain that the state used a beach renourishment program to strip them of their legal rights as waterfront property owners.

Under the Flor*ida plan, sand was pumped onto the beach and the state claimed the new dry land for itself. Private waterfront property suddenly became landlocked.

A state appeals court ruled that the owners were due just compensation from the state, but Florida's Supreme Court upheld the state action.

In US v. Comstock, the court will examine a federal law that allows the government to hold alleged sexual predators indefinitely in protective custody once they are deemed to be "sexually dangerous," even after they have served a full criminal sentence.



One of the key things to look for is how Sotomayor votes in cases such as Shatzer, Graham, Sullivan, and Comstock. I'm of the opinion that she will join Alito and Roberts on some of these criminal law/procedure cases.

Red Dog
10-05-09, 11:04 AM
And three of the more notable cases start right off the bat. Oral arguments for....

Maryland v. Shatzer (08-680) — limits on police questioning after a suspect asks for a lawyer

United States v. Stevens (08-769) — government power to criminalize videos and other depictions of animal cruelty

Salazar v. Buono (08-472) — right to sue to challenge a religious symbol on public lands

.....take place this week.

classicman2
10-05-09, 11:35 AM
One of the key things to look for is how Sotomayor votes in cases such as Shatzer, Graham, Sullivan, and Comstock. I'm of the opinion that she will join Alito and Roberts on some of these criminal law/procedure cases.

And if she doesn't, will you admit that my contention that she's just another Ginsburg clone is correct? :)

Red Dog
10-05-09, 11:37 AM
And if she doesn't, will you admit that my contention that she's just another Ginsburg clone is correct? :)

No. Because except for not having a Y chromosome, she's more Souter than Ginsburg.

classicman2
10-05-09, 11:39 AM
What was the big difference between Souter and Ginsburg - except gender & the vote on the Florida recount?

Red Dog
10-05-09, 11:47 AM
Notable cases/issues where cert was denied (no SCt review):

- The Florida Pledge of Allegiance law which required recitation in public schools unless students had written permission from their parents excusing them. The 11th Circuit upheld most of the law. Haven't read that case, but I have a hard time imagining how that is consistent with Barnette (1943), where the SCt ruled that school children could not be forced to recite the Pledge as a part of their school day routine.

- A pro-life group trying to force the state of Illinois to issue "Choose Life" license plates. The 7th Circuit ruled that state officials were within their rights in trying to keep viewpoints on abortion off of Illinois license plates.

Red Dog
10-05-09, 11:50 AM
What was the big difference between Souter and Ginsburg - except gender & the vote on the Florida recount?

I think Ginsburg is a far more gifted writer and persuader on the Court. Souter opinions are about as blah as one can get. Otherwise, there's not a lot of difference from a philosophical standpoint - Souter was a bit to the right of Ginsburg overall.

Decadance
10-05-09, 11:58 AM
First time for everything. I agree with classicman2. There simply is not a large difference in terms of ideology for Souter and Ginsburg. Below are a couple of spatial models I did for a Supreme Court Preview lecture for my University. As you can see, Souter and Ginsburg were extremely close.

http://homepages.wmich.edu/~t6curry/images/temp1.jpg

And for those interested. This is what the upcoming terms ideological distribution should look like based upon Sotomayor's ideological score from the CoA. (My own two cents is she will drift further left, though if her previous voting in criminal cases is accurate, than she may well be located correctly.)

http://homepages.wmich.edu/~t6curry/images/temp2.jpg

Red Dog
10-05-09, 12:03 PM
Based on what you say and your graphs, it sure looks like you agree with me. :lol:

Decadance
10-05-09, 12:09 PM
Well, saying that Sotomayor is more Souter than Ginsburg is incorrect. Ideologically, she is more Kennedy than Souter.

Red Dog
10-05-09, 12:15 PM
Well, saying that Sotomayor is more Souter than Ginsburg is incorrect. Ideologically, she is more Kennedy than Souter.

I don't follow that based on your graphs. Your graphs put her in the same 'spot' previously occupied by Souter (4th, left-to-right). (Although I don't agree with that - I would put Breyer 4th while Souter would have been 3rd.). Your graph has the difference between Sotomayor and Souter being .113 while the difference between Sotomayor and Kennedy is .276, so how is she more Kennedy than Souter? :hscratch:

I also don't follow where your agreement with classicman is.

Plus I already noted that I expect her to be somewhat to the right of Souter, based on law & order considerations. You graph certainly suggests that too.

Decadance
10-05-09, 12:35 PM
No. Because except for not having a Y chromosome, she's more Souter than Ginsburg.

She is more "Souter" in the direct sense, but this implies that there was a difference between Souter and Ginsburg, which I claim does no exist.

The reason why I argue she is more Kennedy than Souter or Ginsburg is because it is perceived that she will reside outside of the two consistently united voting blocs. This is debatable, but it is a gut call.

And yes, I do agree with you that criminal issues may pull her right.

I personally think the most interesting vote for her will be in American Needle (which I think is a completely fascinating case regarding the Copperweld Doctrine and the "single entity" defense).

Red Dog
10-05-09, 01:26 PM
The reason why I argue she is more Kennedy than Souter or Ginsburg is because it is perceived that she will reside outside of the two consistently united voting blocs. This is debatable, but it is a gut call.



It seems to me that the general perception is that she will be regular part of the liberal bloc.

Now I disagree with that perception when it comes to one area (criminal procedure). Otherwise, she'll be a reliable member of the liberal bloc, at least on constitutional cases.

Baron Of Hell
10-05-09, 02:18 PM
C-span is doing a week long special on the supreme court. It is on every day at 6 pm pst 9 est

Red Dog
10-06-09, 04:24 PM
I read that Justice O'Connor is apparently perturbed that some of her rulings are being dismantled. Gee I wonder why your rulings are getting dismantled, Justice Wishy-Washy. -rolleyes-



Anyhoo, back to the current-day Court....here's a synopsis of oral arguments from U.S. v. Stevens:

http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-animal-cruelty-law-in-trouble/#more-11476

Congress’ attempt ten years ago to ban animal cruelty, by banning video and other depictions of it, had its first constitutional test in the Supreme Court Tuesday, and appeared to have failed. Despite efforts by an Obama Administration lawyer to show that Congress wrote carefully and narrowly, most of the Justices strongly implied that the law probably goes too far — or at least was so vague that no one can know just what is illegal. Only one Justice, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., seemed tempted to support the law as is.

The case of U.S. v. Stevens (08-769) tests the constitutionality of the 1999 law that made it a federal crime to make and sell commercially “any visual or auditory depiction” of killing or seriously abusing a living animal, if the conduct is illegal under either federal or a state’s law. The Justices, loosing a series of hypotheticals on what kind of conduct could not be depicted legally under the law – from bull-fighting to using geese to make foie gras, suggested that the statute likely would reach far beyond what Congress was actually seeking to ban.

Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Neal K. Katyal, asking the Court to reinstate the law that had been nullified by the Third Circuit Court, said Congress intended to shut down “a robust market” for so-called “crush videos,” images of small animals being stomped to death. It was, he said, a “narrowly targeted restriction.”

But he was only a few words into his opening when Justice Sonia Sotomayor questioned whether Congress had any evidence that there was “such a robust market” for videos of dog-fighting or even of hunting. Katyal countered by stressing anew that the law was limited in scope, did not apply to hunting, and was a challenge only to the commercial market. That simply prompted Justice Antonin Scalia to say that applying it only to a “commercial market” was not to limit it, since that would embrace “anything sold.”

From then on, Scalia continued to assail the sweep of the law, and other Justices joined in the challenge. Scalia was so relentless that, when Patricia A. Millett, the lawyer speaking against the law, seemed to be leaving some opening for Congress to pass laws in this area, the Justice gave her a mini-lecture on “it is not up to the government to decide what our worst instincts are.” Millett had the most difficulty fending off questions from Justice Alito about whether Congress could write a law that would ban a TV channel devoted to “human sacrifice.”

In contrast to Katyal’s argument (seemingly one that made no discernible headway with the Court) that the law was a strictly limited one, Millett suggested that it would apply so widely that courts simply could not salvage it by trying to spell out what it did not cover. “You would have to excise so many things, I don’t know what you would have left,” she said.

Katyal had been challenged rigorously throughout his argument, but Millett did not encounter any serious pressure, until Justice Alito opted to join actively in the questioning.

Alito suggested that the law may have accomplished, over its decade on the books, just what Congress had in mind: it had dried up the market for “crush videos,” while not causing a decrease in videos or TV shows about hunting. He told Millett she should be addressing “what’s going on in the real world,” and not focus on hypotheticals like producing foie gras with geese. She replied that, if Congress were to write laws in the First Amendment area, it had to “write with a scalpel and not with a buzz saw.”

But she seemed less sure of her argument when Alito moved on to questions about Congress’ authority, hypothetically, to try to stop human sacrifice by banning its depiction on videos and in other media. She at first said that such a law might be valid if it were “properly drawn” and “narrowly tailored.” As other members of the Court showed some interest in the human sacrifice hypothetical, Millett made further concessions even while not answering directly. First Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and then Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., insisted on a direct response to Alito’s hypothetical. She answered that Congress could legislate in this area, unless it sought to ban the content of such depictions “just because it did not like it.”

A final decision in the case is not expected for at least several weeks.



I haven't seen the statute but when I first heard about this case, I wondered how general it was because I thought of similar hypotheticals. I wouldn't be surprised if it was struck down for vagueness.

wmansir
10-06-09, 07:31 PM
What's the difference between this law and anti-child pornography or other anti-obscene material laws?

Red Dog
10-07-09, 08:37 AM
Keep in mind that the internet anti-child pornography laws keep getting struck down for vagueness.

The Bus
10-07-09, 11:25 AM
As per usual, once we go past the Time article, I'm lost on the discussion. :lol:

However, the cases are indeed really interesting. $5 says Red Dog is going to pay the most attention to American Needle vs. National Football League.

Red Dog
10-07-09, 12:08 PM
As per usual, once we go past the Time article, I'm lost on the discussion. :lol:

However, the cases are indeed really interesting. $5 says Red Dog is going to pay the most attention to American Needle vs. National Football League.

You owe me $5. :) Not to say that the NFL case isn't interesting, but antitrust law isn't something I pay much attention to.

The 2nd amendment incorporation case is definitely the most interesting to me simply because the incorporation doctrine has traditionally been championed by liberals who must decide how to handle for a right they abhor, while you have conservatives generallly inclined against incorporation deciding how to handle it for a right that conservatives champion. It's a classic conundrum. ;)

JasonF
10-07-09, 12:19 PM
You owe me $5. :) Not to say that the NFL case isn't interesting, but antitrust law isn't something I pay much attention to.

The 2nd amendment incorporation case is definitely the most interesting to me simply because the incorporation doctrine has traditionally been championed by liberals who must decide how to handle for a right they abhor, while you have conservatives generallly inclined against incorporation deciding how to handle it for a right that conservatives champion. It's a classic conundrum. ;)

I think the incorporation case will be 8-1 in favor of incorporation, with Thomas the lone dissent. Or possibly, he'll vote in favor of P&I incorporation. I also think that the majority opinion will make it clear that reasonable restrictions on the right to bear arms are constitutional, but will punt on articulating any sort of standard of review for those restrictions beyond striking down an outright ban.

Red Dog
10-07-09, 12:25 PM
I think the incorporation case will be 8-1 in favor of incorporation, with Thomas the lone dissent. Or possibly, he'll vote in favor of P&I incorporation.

I'd love to see that since I think P&I incorporation is the correct way to handle it. Of course, were he to do the right thing, he'll get labeled the wacko as usual.

JasonF
10-07-09, 12:56 PM
Is there a practical difference between due process incorporation and P&I incorporation apart from the citizenship distinction? The academic in me thinks P&I incorporation is the more correct way to go in terms of the language of the Amendment and the legislative history. But the practical litigator (and citizen!) in me thinks that as long as the states can't infringe my First (or Second, or Fifth, or ... ) Amendment rights, I don't really care whether they overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases.

Red Dog
10-07-09, 01:28 PM
Ask one of your favorites....Justice Frankfurter. ;)

JasonF
10-07-09, 03:31 PM
It's been a while since I studied this stuff, but wasn't Justice Frankfurter opposed to incorporation outright, reading the 14th Amendment due process clause as simply protecting certain procedural rights. But the Court ultimately rejected his approach and read the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause as Justice Black argued -- as incorporating a broad array of federal rights against the states. So I don't see this as a debate between the Frankfurter and Black positions. The Frankfurter position is dead and burried. Rather, it's a debate between the Black view of incorporation and the minority (Justice Field) view from the Slaughter-House Cases. And while I think the Field approach is superior to the Black approach from a purely academic point of view, I'm not sure that I see them arriving at a different destination.

Red Dog
10-07-09, 03:35 PM
As I remember it, Frankfurter championed selective incremental incorporation.

I think the question would be if you switched the rationale to P&I incorporation, 1) how do you do that in a single opinion, and 2) what does that do for non-enumerated rights outside the specific ones in the Bill of Rights.

How does P&I incorporation address establishment clause jurisprudence on a state level? That's not really a P/I of a citizen. You can bet that if Thomas were to write a P&I opinion, it wouldn't include that.

The Bus
10-07-09, 03:58 PM
This is becoming so lawyerly it's reminding me of Politics Sheep.

Red Dog
10-07-09, 04:15 PM
Salazar v. Buono
At issue: Whether the government can permit the display of a crucifix on public land as per the Establishment Clause.

An 8-ft.-tall crucifix has stood on an outcrop called Sunrise Rock on the Mojave National Preserve since 1934, but in one of the court's earliest arguments of the term, the Justices will be asked to consider whether it should be removed. The battle has been brewing for a while — the cross, erected without government approval, was slated for removal by the U.S. National Park Service after a request from Buddhists to create their own memorial near the site was denied. But in 2000, Congress hastily passed a law prohibiting the use of public funds to remove the cross, in essence tying the National Park Service's hands. Congress declared the cross a National Memorial in 2002, and in 2003 it gave the small parcel of land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) — the group that constructed the original cross. (See TIME's photo-essay "Sonia Sotomayor, the Making of a Judge.")

The removal of the cross brings up the Establishment Clause, that long-debated line separating church and state that takes its name from the First Amendment (which begins, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"). This case has been in the court system since early 2000, before Congress's involvement. The National Park Service's attempt to transfer the land to the VFW, per the 2003 congressional order, has been viewed by the lower courts as an illegal way of circumventing repeated rulings compelling it to remove the cross. (Once the land is considered private property, the Establishment Clause no longer applies.) The Supreme Court will be asked to sort out the issue — and ownership of Sunrise Rock — once and for all.



Oral argument analysis:
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-a-case-of-disappearing-issues/#more-11566

Haggling over what issues are actually before them, the Supreme Court Justices on Wednesday turned a major case on the constitutionality of religious monuments on government property into what seemed like a mere shadow of its former self. As the case of Salazar v. Buono (08-472) reached the Court, it looked like a significant new test of such displays, of who could challenge them, and of how the government could react if told to take them down. But, after an hour of oral argument, only the last of those was still in play, and it appeared to have been pared down to its specific facts, with few if any wider implications.


The case of the Christian cross standing alone in the midst of a huge federal land preserve in a California desert put before the Court the latest in a continuing series of controversies over religious commemoration in public places. Lower federal courts had found the cross’s presence there unconstitutional, and barred enforcement of an attempt by Congress in 2004 to shift ownership of the site into private hands in a bid to save the cross. The federal government took the case to the Supreme Court to protest those rulings.

Despite strenuous efforts by Justice Antonin Scalia to keep alive the core question of whether the cross display was a violation of the Constitution’s Establishment Clause, the dominant sentiment on the bench seemed to be that that was no longer open to review. And despite efforts by U.S. Solicitor General Elena Kagan to get the Court to focus on whether a former park service officer had any right to sue to test the display, that, too, seemed to be beyond the Court’s reach. Kagan, in fact, had to endure lectures by several of the Justices that the government should have tested that question earlier in the case and so had now missed its chance.

The Solicitor General, and a California civil liberties lawyer on the other side, Peter J. Eliasberg, found themselves compelled to pore over the details of Congress’s response to the lower court rulings, rather than arguing broad constitutional principles. The effect was to significantly shrink even the remaining issue in the case.

Kagan insisted that those details showed that Congress only wanted to keep a “war memorial” on the site, which only incidentally was a religious symbol, so there was no basis for blocking the land transfer; it cured any constitutional problem. Eliasberg countered that those details showed that Congress had singled out a single religious faith for favoritism, gave that cross a monumental status that few other iconic structures get, did not actually forfeit its interest in keeping the Mojave cross standing on Sunrise Rock, and thus remained in a continuing constitutional violation.

While the Justices showed a lively interest in those details, that, too, simply reinforced the impression that the case no longer ranked on the grand scale of potential precedents of sweeping impact. Large questions of separating church and state tended to get lost in close questioning about a “reversionary interest” the government has in Sunrise Rock, and about what kinds of signs the National Park Service might put up on or near this cross to make it seem like the display was conveying someone else’s message, rather than the government’s.

Justice Scalia spent considerable effort in trying to keep the argument on the constitutionality of the cross’s display. He said the government had no obligation, just because it put up a monument to one faith, to have other monuments on the same site to other faiths. In fact, he said, the Mojave cross was a commemoration of the service of soldiers of all faiths, including Jews and Muslims. Scalia said it was “outrageous” to suggest otherwise.

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., suggested that the Court should take the government at its word, that Congress had washed its hands of the cross and had remedied whatever Establishment Clause problem its presence on public land had caused. Echoing the Solicitor General’s core argument, Alito said Congress’s only interest was in maintaining a war memorial.

Beyond those two, however, the remaining Justices who took part (Justice Clarence Thomas remained silent) raised questions and made comments in what sounded much like a seminar on federal court jurisdiction and the meaning and scope of court injunctions. In the few moments when the members of the Court discussed the merits of the case, they simply bypassed the right-to-sue issue and the validity of this particular display, choosing instead to analyze the legal effect of the steps Congress took to protect the display from its challengers.


Looks like the issues in this case have been watered down. Frankly, I found it to be a rather silly case to be litigated at this level; if the appeals court had found for the gov't, it would probably have never made the SCt. docket.

JasonF
10-07-09, 05:53 PM
Buono seems like a very dangerous case. On the one hand, the government's actions in selling the miniscule parcel of land surrounding the cross were utterly shameless. On the other hand, I'm not sure how you draw the line between something like that and a perfectly appropriate transfer of government land to a private party.

Red Dog
10-08-09, 09:46 AM
Is there a practical difference between due process incorporation and P&I incorporation apart from the citizenship distinction? The academic in me thinks P&I incorporation is the more correct way to go in terms of the language of the Amendment and the legislative history. But the practical litigator (and citizen!) in me thinks that as long as the states can't infringe my First (or Second, or Fifth, or ... ) Amendment rights, I don't really care whether they overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases.

Very good article by Professor Dorf on findlaw.com yesterday. The 7th amendment application to the states is a very interesting issue.

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=/dorf/20091007.html

Does the Second Amendment Bind the States?
By MICHAEL C. DORF

Wednesday, October 6, 2009

In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court invalidated a Washington, D.C. handgun ban as applied to home possession by a law-abiding citizen. The 5-4 majority said that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense. Although recognizing the government's ability to regulate firearms possession, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court found that a complete ban on handguns went too far.

Heller involved the District of Columbia, an arm of the federal government. Accordingly, the case did not provide an opportunity for the Court to rule on whether the Second Amendment limits state and local gun control laws. Three Nineteenth Century precedents say that the Second Amendment does not limit state (or by implication, local) gun control laws. However, as the Heller Court observed in a footnote, those cases pre-date Twentieth Century cases setting forth the modern approach to determining which provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the states. The Court thereby invited gun right advocates to challenge state and local laws. They readily accepted the invitation.

Last week, the Court announced that it would hear a case, McDonald v. Chicago, posing the question whether the Second Amendment applies to the states and their sub-divisions. In lawyer's jargon, McDonald requires the Court to say whether the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the Second Amendment against the states. As I shall explain in this column, the case poses an intellectual challenge for the Justices who were in the Heller majority. To see why, we will need to begin by reviewing the story of how other constitutional rights came to be incorporated against the states.

The Original Bill of Rights Limited the Federal Government, But Not the States

Two provisions of the Bill of Rights--the First Amendment, which specifically refers to "Congress," and the second clause of the Seventh Amendment, which refers to federal courts--make clear by their language that they are only limits on federal action. The balance of the Bill of Rights, however, sets out rights of the People that, taken at face value, could be said to bar infringements by the states and their sub-divisions as well as by the federal government.

Yet that was not how the Bill of Rights was originally understood. In the first Congress, James Madison proposed an amendment that would bar states from violating "the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." The proposal was defeated, largely because Madison's fellow representatives saw the Bill of Rights as a check on the federal government alone. State constitutions, they thought, already provided whatever rights were needed against state (and local) violations.

The Supreme Court confirmed that the original Bill of Rights only limited the federal government in the 1833 case of Barron v. City of Baltimore.

Incorporation Against the States Via the Privileges or Immunities Clause?

There matters stood until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. It states, in relevant part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

The Privileges or Immunities Clause appears to be a quite natural way of saying that the Bill of Rights, formerly only a limit on the federal government, is now a limit on the states as well. Under this straightforward reading, the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"--that is, the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights--are protected against each "State."

And in fact, there is pretty good evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was expected to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. Article IV of the original Constitution protects against interstate discrimination with regard to "all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." That Privileges and Immunities Clause was famously interpreted by Justice Bushrod Washington (a nephew of the first President) in the case of Corfield v. Coryell as encompassing those fundamental rights enjoyed by "citizens of all free governments." The framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware of Corfield, and by choosing to parallel the Article IV language, they can be understood to have intended to adopt its approach.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected that broad reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause shortly after its adoption. In the 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court read the Clause very narrowly, essentially as protection for rights that were already protected by the language and structure of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment Constitution. From that moment forward, the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been treated as nearly a dead letter.

Incorporation Via the Due Process Clause

Yet as most Americans know, the Bill of Rights does limit the states and their subdivisions. State officials cannot ban political rallies or coerce confessions from criminal suspects without violating the First and Fifth Amendments, respectively. Given Barron and Slaughterhouse, what makes these and other provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states?

The answer is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a series of Twentieth Century cases, the Court held that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights do limit the states after all. For example, in order to deprive a person of his life, due process means that a trial by jury must be given, as set forth in the Sixth Amendment. To deprive a person of her freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, due process means that the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be honored.

The Due Process Clause works well as a basis for incorporation of the procedural rights in the foregoing examples. But it provides an awkward textual basis for incorporating more substantive rights, like the First Amendment's protection for speech and the press. Those rights do not merely require the government to provide trials for political dissidents; they forbid prosecution for sedition outright.

Nonetheless, under a doctrine that has come to be known as "substantive due process," the Court has held that the Due Process has a substantive component. Under this approach, no amount of fair process suffices to infringe certain fundamental substantive liberties, so that any unwarranted substantive infringement is, ipso facto, a violation of due process.

Academics and Supreme Court Justices alike have long been troubled by the seemingly oxymoronic character of the substantive due process doctrine. The late law professor and dean John Hart Ely likened it to "green pastel redness." The late Justice Hugo Black tried to get around the doctrine by arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, including the Privileges or Immunities Clause, accomplishes incorporation. And in his dissenting opinion in the 1999 case of Saenz v. Roe, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested that the Slaughterhouse Cases might be overruled and, if that were to occur, then some of the work now done by the Due Process Clause could be shifted to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Incorporation and Textualism

Despite the criticisms, the Due Process Clause remains the basis for incorporation of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. And that, in turn, poses a jurisprudential problem for the self-described textualists in the Heller majority--especially Heller's author, Justice Antonin Scalia.

Justice Scalia has been one of the most vocal critics of substantive due process, which is, after all, the basis for the Court's recognition of unenumerated rights such as those protecting abortion and same-sex sexual conduct. The Constitution does not mention these rights, Scalia says, and therefore the Court has no business recognizing or enforcing them.

Yet the Constitution also does not mention a right to firearms possession as a limit on the states. The way that right will limit the states, if it does limit them, is via substantive due process or, if the Court chooses to overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases, via the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Neither doctrinal path will offer a sound basis for distinguishing between enumerated and unenumerated rights.

To be sure, the incorporation of enumerated rights feels more textually rooted than the recognition of unenumerated rights, because it begins with the text of the Bill of Rights. However, it does not end there. Justice Black argued that the Bill of Rights should be incorporated "jot for jot," so that any right against the federal government would be enforceable to an equal degree against the states. He lost that battle along both fronts: The Court applies some unenumerated rights (such as contraception and abortion) against the states, even as it does not apply some of the rights that are enumerated in the Bill of Rights against the states.

How did the Court decide which provisions of the Bill of Rights to incorporate? It asked, as the Court said in the 1968 case of Duncan v. Louisiana, which rights are "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." And under that test, most but not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated. The rights not incorporated include those described in the seldom-used Third Amendment, the grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment, the civil jury trial right of the Seventh Amendment, and, thus far, the Second Amendment. (In addition, the criminal jury trial right of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted less strictly with respect to the states than with respect to the federal government.)

Accordingly, if Justice Scalia wants to say that the Second Amendment right to firearms possession does limit the states, he must either accept the idea that Justices are qualified to say which rights are more fundamental than others--a process he has criticized as unprincipled with respect to unenumerated rights--or commit himself to Hugo Black's jot-for-jot approach, which would entail massive costs for the state courts; they would need to greatly expand their use of juries if the Seventh Amendment were incorporated. (The first sentence of the Seventh Amendment is not limited by its text to federal courts, in the way that the second sentence is.)

Stare Decisis and the Textualist's Dilemma

Might Justice Scalia and his fellow travelers invoke stare decisis--the principle of respect for precedent--as a means of justifying incorporation of the Second Amendment but not the Seventh Amendment, under the principle that only the most fundamental enumerated rights apply to the states? The problem is that that move itself would appear to be unprincipled.

If the Court were really to adhere to stare decisis in this area, that would mean upholding the Nineteenth Century cases that hold that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states. If the Court were instead to say that the Nineteenth Century caseshave already been sapped of their strength by the modern incorporation cases, then one would have to ask why Justice Scalia feels free to disregard that same line of modern cases insofar as it authorizes the recognition of unenumerated rights (such as abortion) as well as enumerated ones (such as free speech). A commitment to precedent would not distinguish between these two faces of modern substantive due process doctrine. Meanwhile, shifting the basis for the doctrine to the Privileges or Immunities Clause could hardly be justified in the name of precedent, and even if it could, the shift would not help: The text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not favor enumerated over unenumerated rights, nor, for that matter, does it favor incorporating the Second Amendment over the first sentence of the Seventh Amendment.

In the end, Justice Scalia, like Justice Black before him, is a peculiar sort of textualist. His real commitment is to avoiding the appearance that judges are finding constitutional rights in their own subjective values, rather than in the text of the Constitution. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights--or at least Black's version of jot-for-jot incorporation--avoids this appearance because it enables the judge to point to a textual basis for each right enforced against the states.

But the Black/Scalia version of textualism is peculiar, or at least ironic, because the text of the Constitution itself points away from it. The Ninth Amendment says that "enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Justice Scalia and others have tried heroically to escape the plain meaning of this rejection of their brand of textualism by arguing, among other things, that the rights retained by the People are not constitutional rights. Yet that is a highly strained reading: Everywhere else that the Constitution uses the term "rights," including in the first half of the Ninth Amendment itself, that term clearly refers to constitutional rights.

To be sure, the McDonald case does not directly present any question about unenumerated rights. In Heller, Justice Scalia emphasized for the Court that the enumerated text of the Second Amendment was the driving force behind the decision to find an individual right to firearms possession. In McDonald, the Court could simply say that the protections of the Second Amendment are on par with most of the other protections of the Bill of Rights.

That sort of minimalist decision would not be persuasive, however, for the principles underlying the incorporation doctrine do not readily admit of the sharp distinction that Justice Scalia and others would draw between enumerated and unenumerated rights. That was the core point that conservative Fourth Circuit Appeals Court Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson made in a recent article in the Virginia Law Review. Judge Wilkinson thought that Heller employed the same core methodology as Roe v. Wade, notwithstanding the enumeration in the Second Amendment's text of a "right to bear arms." Given the contest over the meaning of that language, he said, the right at issue in Heller was at best "ambiguously" enumerated, and therefore the very concerns that drive conservatives to question recognition of unenumerated rights should have, but were not, in play in Heller. Whether they will come into play in McDonald remains to be seen.

CaptainMarvel
10-08-09, 08:11 PM
I am a big fan of Sonya Sotomayor.

Me too. I find that she somehow almost intrinsically seems to know how to make better decisions than I do.

Decadance
10-08-09, 08:29 PM
I am a big fan of Sonya Sotomayor.

It is easy to admire someone who has done nothing at their job. Wait till she actually casts a vote.

Red Dog
10-12-09, 09:46 AM
Interesting article I read this weekend about ideological drift and how the first year of a Justice usually isn't a good predictor of future ideology. It's got a lot of graphs too. ;)

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/firstyear.pdf

Decadance
10-12-09, 10:38 AM
In the first four articles they cite, two of them are authored by two of my advisers, so I am a tad familiar with them. The Judicial Common Space Scores (which I made use of above), is the baby of Lee, Jeff, Andrew, and to a lesser extent Kevin. They were developed in order to Lee to assess ideological drift, one of her long term pet projects.

If this is the type of stuff you like reading, I could plaster the thread with applicable links.

Decadance
11-12-09, 11:12 AM
And now for something completely different. http://fantasyscotus.net/
Was posted on the Law and Courts Listserv today, and was fairly certain some here would be interested in playing.

Tracer Bullet
11-12-09, 11:51 AM
Red Dog just got the hardest erection ever.

Venusian
11-12-09, 12:08 PM
:lol:

Red Dog
11-12-09, 12:30 PM
Actually, no. Scotus fantasy leagues have been around for several years. I think volokh.com or scotusblog was pushing one for a few years. Too geeky even for me. I know next to nothing about the non-constitutional cases they preside over.

Decadance
11-12-09, 01:30 PM
I have already run some models since this went up, based on the cases which have had oral arguments...guess that makes me more geeky.

Tracer Bullet
11-12-09, 01:35 PM
I have already run some models since this went up, based on the cases which have had oral arguments...guess that makes me more geeky.

That would not have been my first word choice.

Red Dog
11-16-09, 12:20 PM
SCt denies cert on the Washington Redskins trademark protection lawsuit filed by Native Americans.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111601298.html?hpid=topnews